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Abstract 
For Marx, the necessity of freedom has ontological grounding. When our capacity to 
labour is alienated from us and applied to abstract ends, we are unfree. For Marcuse, 
repressive needs prevent the development of what he calls “inner freedom.” This is the 
capacity to think critically and act autonomously from repressive society, to have 
different needs and desires than those which are imposed. However, in The Aesthetic 
Dimension, Marcuse argues that experiencing art interrupts unreflective involvement in 
the world, infecting experience with awareness of an inner dimension that is suppressed 
and distorted by those appearances. In this capacity of art Marcuse sees the potential 
for the reinvigoration of inner freedom. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
I began this project originally with the intention to write about what critical theory 
can tell us about ecological crises in what is being called by some ecologists the 
Anthropocene. “Anthropocene” designates our current geological era, in which any 
account of nature cannot exclude human activity. Of course, any account of nature in 
general should not exclude human beings, simply because we are nature, but the term is 
intended to designate that we have affect on every ecosystem and form of life on the 
planet. 
As I pursued my topic I began to realize that it was a bit awkward and open 
ended. To be sure, I could study critiques of modernity, industrialization, and 
instrumental rationality and point to them as the culprits. However, what struck me as 
difficult about the topic is what I consider to be the near redundancy of such a study to 
our current predicament unless it has a foundation in praxis. In other words, the problem 
is not so much that we are destroying the planet and we only need to discover the ways 
in which we are doing so. That work has been done. The problem is that so far we have 
been unable to stop these practices.  
Consequently, this paper is about human freedom and agency for Marx and 
Marcuse. The investigation centres around not only Marx’s industrial capitalism, but 
more so around Marcuse’s “advanced industrial technological society,”1 which is not 
characterized by many of the tensions present in Marx’s capitalism, or the tensions are 
at least actively negated. Marcuse writes, “Under the conditions of a rising standard of 
living, non-conformity with the system itself appears to be socially useless, and the more 
so when it entails tangible economic and political disadvantages and threatens the 
smooth operation of the whole” (2). 
 
1 See One-Dimensional Man 
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If Marx’s capitalism was characterized by definite tensions between capital and 
the alienated workers, then Marcuse’s advanced industrial technological society is 
characterized by a neat synthesis between the majority of the population and the 
technological apparatus. This is due to a rising standard of living which obviates the use 
value [!] of anything but conformity. If the technological apparatus does not demand for 
the cost of our consumption slavish toil, if conformity becomes ever more comfortable, 
ever more rewarding, beyond any promised image of a liberated society, then surely 
individuals will find less reason to revolt.  
Of course the absurdity of the situation is immediately apparent to us, as the 
society as a whole is characterized by destruction and suffering. Furthermore, Marcuse’s 
prediction that world fascism has not yet been realized, delivered in 1964, seems to be 
coming true as we witness the atrocities in Israel and Ukraine and the allegiance of 
Canada with these fascist powers, not to mention the less obvious rise of fascist parties 
in Europe. The need to change the situation locally and globally becomes ever more 
pressing seemingly as each month goes by. A solution to these issues requires no less 
than a total reconfiguration of society, a realization which is actively militated against by 
society. For all these reasons I have decided to discuss human freedom in the context of 
civilization today. 
The first paper, titled “Marx’s Ontology of Freedom,” seeks to demonstrate the 
ontological grounding of the necessity of freedom in Marx’s work by exploring labour. 
Labour, for Marx, in the solely human capacity through which we transform the world 
according to reason. It is not labour as we think in the colloquial sense. However, 
capitalism appropriates labour, subjecting it to ends that are not our own, ends that are 
not self-determined. Rather, these ends are determined by what Marx calls “exchange 
value,” which is essentially a determination that almost completely departs from the 
material, human realities of food, clothing, shelter, etc. In concluding, I show that 
exchange value, like all real abstractions, is inherently “one-sided.” That is, these 
abstractions favour some interests to the exclusion of most. For example, Marx 
highlights the arbitrariness of the criminalization of the peasants’ collection of dead wood 
simply because the trees from which the wood falls have been designated “private 
property.” This abstract designation ignores the fact that peasants had customarily 
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collected dead wood, in order to survive the winter, long before private property was 
institutionalized and universalized as a form. These impositions are all, according to 
Marx’s ontology, not just impositions on human needs and dignity, but on our human 
capability to appropriate and transform our material surroundings in a rational, self-
determined way. 
The second paper is titled “Repressive Needs and Inner Freedom in One-
Dimensional Man.” In it I show how, for Marcuse, needs that are imposed upon the 
majority of the population by the technological apparatus serve not only to keep people 
invested in the system, but to ensure that they are unable to comprehend its irrational 
character. For example, the need to constantly secure enough money to pay for housing 
is a false need. It is a need that arises not out of the concrete reality and its possibilities, 
but the socially necessity of maintaining the status quo. In terms of social wealth, there is 
by far enough to ensure that no one ever need worry about where they will live. False 
needs serve to keep people invested and dependent upon the status quo, and are 
therefore repressive. Furthermore, false needs inhibit the development of what Marcuse 
calls “inner freedom,” or critical consciousness, because constant, necessary investment 
in the system precludes autonomy in action.  
Lastly, my paper “Transcendence and Rebellious Subjectivity in The Aesthetic 
Dimension” outlines the possibility that Marcuse sees in art for reinvigorating a critical 
awareness of society. By virtue of what Marcuse calls the “aesthetic form” art mediates 
and transforms the world in such a way that its meaning is altered. The world through art 
is exposed as repressive, as we are pulled out of our immediate involvement with 
society in the constant pursuit of false needs, and exposed to that very inner dimension 
(or freedom) which Marcuse says is precluded by false needs. Marcuse sees the 
experience of art as the potential for the rebirth of the “rebellious subjectivity,” meaning 
one who recognizes the repressive nature of society as it is and recognizes the need for 
liberation. In other words, art reveals the possibility of freedom itself. 
The concern with art appears to need some justification. In Marcuse’s work, the 
potentially liberating power of art really does represent the last shred of hope for 
humanity. It is not enough that we are politically conscious, for there is nothing about 
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political consciousness alone that will keep us from going to work, keep us from 
reproducing a destructive society. Rather, art alone has the power to radically transform 
our needs to the point of making living in this society unbearable, and it is only when life 
in this society becomes unbearable to individuals that they will be driven to change it. 
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Chapter 2. Marx’s Ontology of Freedom  
 The possibility of freedom is always present in Marx’s dialectical critique of 
capitalist society. It is, however, only present in its absence, as something to be realized 
by transcending capitalist society. The movement toward a post-capitalist society is to be 
understood as the realization of the material conditions of freedom. Marx, living on the 
cusp of the transition to industrial capitalism, sought to explain the tumultuous world 
around him with a materialist ontology, exemplified especially in his early writings before 
his turn to pragmatism, in which he develops a unique materialist philosophy which 
emphasizes not a mechanistic understanding of the social world, but one which places 
human agency in a central role in what Marx later called humanity’s “metabolic 
interaction” with nature (Foster 52). While his work does focus on modern capitalist 
society, Marx avoids anthropocentrism, as he understands human beings not just in 
general terms of social relations within a wider “nature,” but in terms of human beings 
and their productive capacities as a natural force. 
 This chapter will present the briefest sketch of Marx’s ontology. The core of 
Marx’s critique of bourgeois society contains an ontological grounding of the potential for 
human freedom rooted in a dialectical conception of nature and production. It is the 
interplay between the objective necessity of our nature and the subjective capacity of 
labour which is the motor force behind history. Furthermore, it will be shown that 
capitalism creates a real barrier to human freedom, in effect compromising our human 
essence. This will be accomplished through an exploration of the ideas of Marxist 
thinkers like Ian Angus, Paul Burkett, John Bellamy Foster and Andrew Feenberg, all of 
whom have written on Marx’s ontology of labour, alongside a close reading of Marx’s 
critique of the “one-sidedness” of private property legislation targeting wood collection. 
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2.1. Labour 
 The question we must first answer if we are concerning ourselves with freedom, 
or rather its absence in modern society, is, what is the nature of human freedom? And, 
to what extent is human freedom withheld from realization?  
 Ian Angus, in “Marx’s Ontology of Labour,” points out that the logic of capital and 
the critique of political economy must rest on an ontological analysis of nature (7, 8). 
This is because central to capital is the appropriation of labour, which is a natural 
process “independent of any social formation.” For Angus, any understanding of the 
historical development of accumulative appropriation must be rooted in the trans-
historical essence of labour if it is to be fully understood. Labour is the process through 
which we as human beings fulfill our needs. These needs are themselves an aspect of 
human objective being. That is, I cannot choose when my stomach feels empty or when 
it rains and I must seek shelter. Through the process of objectively fulfilling these needs 
we create new objective circumstances and therefore new needs. 
 An immanent critique of appropriation of human labour (characterizing 
capitalism), demands consideration of the trans-historical aspects of human labour, 
which are beyond the social relations which constitute its immediate content. How is it 
that we, through labour, are capable of fulfilling our needs? Angus locates this capacity 
in terms of labour’s inherent ability to produce surplus, which is the trans-historical 
aspect of labour. Ultimately, to be able to get beyond the gratification of immediate 
needs one must be able to create more than is immediately necessary and to invest that 
surplus. The process of the accumulation and application of surplus is the basis of all 
societies, and the origins of history, as surplus is the basis of the creation of new 
material contingencies from which arise new needs (Angus 4, 5). In creating new 
material contingencies we also create new capacities which alter the horizon of 
possibilities. 
 This process is not a mechanistic one by which we are perpetually compelled to 
create only to be compelled to create again. However, before addressing the human, 
subjective component of human labour we must address the objective limits. The ability 
 7 
to produce a surplus is not to be credited primarily as a human capacity. Rodents store 
food in their burrows in order to survive the winter. Rather, the subjective aspect of 
surplus production is secondary to nature’s inherent capacity to produce abundance 
(Angus 6), which is then appropriated. 
 In the first part of his book, Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective, Paul 
Burkett outlines Marx’s ontological basis of human history as within the limits of nature. 
While Burkett identifies a humanism in Marx insofar as he sees Marx’s ontology as 
locating in human beings a free, subjective capacity rather than a determined objective 
existence, he nonetheless asserts that Marx sees labour as a natural force (33). Human 
beings are ontologically distinct from, and yet arise out of, nature. In other words, while 
humans are unique, they do not exist outside the parameters of nature. Labour, insofar 
as it is compelled by need which arises out of objective existence, is a natural force. 
 Not only is labour contained within the parameters of the objective existence of 
human beings, but for labour to appropriate surplus there must be no natural barriers to 
this production (Burkett, 34). Therefore, labour may be understood as a dialectical 
struggle with nature, an interplay between subject and object, including the objective 
existence of the subject, in which both are mutually conditioned. While surplus is a 
natural potential, what is distinctly human is the capacity to apply reason to the 
appropriation of surplus. It is the very challenge of nature which demands the application 
of the distinctly human capacity of reason if we are to transcend certain objective modes 
of being (being in constant want of food, shelter, safety etc.).2 It is reason which allows 
human beings to refrain from the satisfaction of immediate needs and not merely store 
but invest surplus into the creation of technology as a means to wrest from nature the 
material bases for the transcendence of constant want (Burkett, 2).3 
 
2 The transcendence of objective modes of being is a distinctly human capacity. The rodent which 
stores food in its burrow does not transcend want of food in order to posit a new mode of being in the world. 
Rather, it only achieves a brief overcoming of the possibility of its own negation: death from starvation due 
to a failure to procure surplus for the winter season. Only we are able to accumulate surplus and invest it in 
a way that opens up wholly new possibilities for being. 
3 A perfect example here is agriculture – not only did people need to find themselves in an 
objective condition of surplus, but they had to acquire that surplus and invest it again in the soil in order to 
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 We have identified human beings and beings of nature, and insofar as we are 
beings of nature we must contend not only with nature external to ourselves in the form 
of an objective world which affects us objectively, but with our own nature. In other 
words, the human subject is challenged with their real existence as an object in a world 
of objects. The process of what Marcuse calls the “struggle for existence” is subjectively 
enacted through labour, in which the subject creates new material circumstances 
according to reason. 
 We are already much closer to discovering the nature of human freedom. 
Already we have identified that there are two dialectically interrelated problems of human 
freedom. The first is that as we are bodies in a material world we are also objects, and 
insofar as we are objects there are things that can happen to us that are beyond our 
control. I cannot choose when it rains, when drought occurs, or when my stomach feels 
empty. Our objective being is a real barrier to freedom insofar as there is a struggle with 
nature which we are compelled to address on a daily basis – the transcendence of this 
struggle could be considered the project of civilization in general. On the other hand, we 
are subjects. That is, our unique human essence which distinguishes us from animals is 
that we have the capacity to apply reason to the world. I can build shelter, seek ground 
water and grow food in an effort to transcend particular objective circumstances, and 
thus create new objective possibilities which are again realized through my subjectivity. 
We are driven, as objects, to labour, but through labour we use our subjectivity in order 
to transcend objective barriers to freedom. Therefore, freedom is not the ability to do 
whatever one wants; to imagine such a possibility is to retreat into idealism. Rather, 
freedom is the ability to address real barriers to the transcendence of necessity, which 
themselves condition barriers to the subjective capacity to carry out rational alternatives. 
2.2. Rationality and Labour 
 In the second chapter of Lukacs, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory, 
 
transcend the condition of always being in want of surplus. Thus the objective conditions of human 
existence were themselves conditioned, with the proper application of human subjective will, or 
agricultural practices, so as to constantly render a surplus in the form of crops. 
 9 
Andrew Feenberg provides an outline of what he calls Marx’s “meta-theory of political 
philosophy.” Feenberg shows that Marx’s earlier work is an attempt to resolve the 
antinomies of need and reason, and that, in so doing, Marx shows how reason, our 
human capacity, in fact arises from need, our material being (31, 33). What I mean by 
the antinomies of need and reason is the contradiction between necessity and reason. In 
other words, a society in which its members operate out of compulsion of necessity will 
not necessarily be a rational society. 
 By using Feuerbach to critique Hegel, Marx displaces the idealist conceptions of 
subject and object as thinking subject and thought object, and places them within a 
materialist ontology. For Marx, the subject is to be thought of as the human being in all 
of their sensuous existence, and the object is to be thought of as a concrete, material 
object (Feenberg, 45). While Hegel seeks to resolve the alienation of subject and object 
in terms of thought, Marx develops a philosophy of praxis through which he claims the 
antinomy of need and reason may be resolved. With Marx, the Absolute, in terms of a 
thinking and creating being, arises out of the contingencies of the material world as the 
human subject. The Absolute is but the abstracted form of human capacities. Marx 
succeeds in resolving the antimony of need and reason, as reason is now understood to 
be arising out of need itself; the thinking subject is now not just “mind” but mind and 
body, reacting rationally to conditions of necessity. However, the resolution of the 
alienation of need and reason is to be accomplished through a material revolution: the 
de-alienation of the products of labour.  
 The important point here is that in shifting the emphasis from the ideal realm to 
the material realm and showing that reason in fact arises out of the whole material 
existence of human beings in relation to the material world, Marx is asserting the 
ontological necessity of freedom. If reason arises out of the necessity of the human 
subject, then a reason which is channeled and controlled by aliened forces, by abstract 
labour, cannot realize its purpose (Feenberg, 56). Insofar as the reason for labour, which 
is oriented to the satisfaction of necessity, is not controlled by the human being from 
which this necessity arises, reason is alienated from need. Or, rather, the reason for 
labour ceases to originate in the being of the subject, and arises from the being of 
another subject. The abstract rationality which compels concrete activity must arise from 
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the rationality of necessity, as opposed to alien ends, in order to be rational at all. In this 
sense, any rationality which is imposed upon the subject is detrimental to human 
freedom. 
 John Bellamy Foster points out that inseparable from the development of Marx’s 
philosophy of praxis is his earlier study in materialist philosophy, as embodied in The 
Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, his doctoral 
dissertation.  
 Epicurus was a Greek materialist philosopher who differed from other materialist 
philosophers of his time on one key issue. Unlike thinkers like Democritus, who thought 
that human activity arose mechanistically out of the movement of atoms, Epicurus 
thought that, while the material world generally followed the laws of mechanistic 
causality, spontaneous action was indeed possible. This was articulated as a minor 
disagreement on the movement of atoms, but in his doctoral dissertation Marx shows 
that this disagreement has major consequences for an understanding of humans and 
society. 
 Because we are, according to Epicurus, material beings in a strictly material 
world our needs are materially determined. I cannot control when I am hungry, except 
through measured consumption of food or a dietary suppressant. But this is specifically 
the point: that we use reason in order to meet the demands of those needs. Insofar as 
we have the capacity to apply reason to material problems we are not rationally 
determined. The creation of culture and society, and the diversity of its forms, is a result 
of the application of reason to material problems.  
 Epicurus (and Marx) eschews religion precisely because it inhibits the individual’s 
ability to apply their capacity for reason to material problems. Any social relations which 
block the free application of reason are to be considered an evil not on moral but 
ontological grounds, as our very essence is compromised. Insofar as Marx’s 
materialism is influenced by Epicurus, at the core of Marx’s critique of bourgeois society 
lies an ontological, not an ethical, motive for the realization of freedom. Quite simply, 
reason is distinctly human and is required by human beings to satisfy material needs 
and create new possibilities. The capitalist accumulation of the products of labour is in 
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fact a conservative channeling of the ontological capacity of human beings to rationally 
create their own circumstances through the project of history. Concrete labour becomes 
subject to the demands of abstract labour and is no longer free. 
2.3. Rationality and Abstraction 
 The result of labour is a necessary alienation of the human subject by the 
objectification of human capacities. This is a necessary alienation insofar as labour 
automatically entails the creation of new objective existences. Even the computer 
programmer creates something that it outside of their subjective being – the lines of 
code which structure his program have been created of his will, but there is nothing 
about them that relies on his continued existence of presence in order for the lines of 
code to continue existing on their own. 
 It is because the products of labour are objectifications separate from the 
producing subject that the possibility of accumulative appropriation exists. Appropriated 
labour is “merely a means to survival. Instead of being like itself, ‘the satisfaction of a 
need,’ labour becomes a means to life such that ‘life’ is expelled outside human self-
production in practical activity” (Burkett, 2). In other words, the actual process of labour 
becomes removed from the process of the satisfaction of need, and instead becomes 
oriented to other goals which suit not the needs of the labourer, but the needs of he who 
appropriates the product.  
 This entire situation implies that there are preceding circumstances which force 
the subject to perform this labour, circumstances which would require a detailed 
historical analysis to fully explicate and which may be justly summed up as the 
separation of most of the population from the means of production, therefore creating 
objective circumstances in which the subject must sell their labour. It may be the case 
that the labourer’s self-perceived rationality for selling their labour is to earn a wage and 
that way meet their needs, but when we peer behind the veil of the dramatis personae 
and at the totality of the objective circumstances, we see that it is the capitalist who 
benefits from the appropriation of the surplus product. According to the definition of 
freedom which we have already laid, being the capacity to invest surplus to realize new 
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objective circumstances, the capitalist has agency at the cost of the labourer. Marx 
opens Capital Volume I with an analysis of the commodity, the objective form of 
appropriated labour, for this very reason. 
 In Capital Volume I Marx, referring to the commodity, writes,  
If we make abstraction from its [the commodity’s] use-value, we abstract 
also from the material constituents and forms which make it a use-
value… With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of 
labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also 
disappears; this in turn entails the disappearance of the different concrete 
forms of labour. They can no longer be distinguished, but are all together 
reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract (128). 
 
This short passage is central to Marx’s critique. First of all, it is important to point out that 
for Marx all labour, regardless of its social form, is oriented to the production of use-
value. This makes sense taken in context of his ontology of labour, in which labour is 
applied to meet the needs of human beings. Therefore the product of labour must have 
some use, or use-value. But, if we make an abstraction from the production of use-value, 
if use-value is not the primary reason that something is produces, then the useful 
character of labour is itself abstracted or obscured. 
 This abstraction occurs when we are compelled to sell our labour in order to 
create exchange value. Exchange value is the valuation of commodities not according to 
their use-value, but their socially necessary labour time. To be sure, for anything to have 
an exchange value it must have a use-value; the commodity must have a purpose for it 
to be saleable. Nonetheless, the reason for the production of the commodity, when 
placed in the totality of capitalist social relations, is not according to the use-value of the 
commodity, which is itself conditioned by necessity arising from objective circumstances, 
but rather it is produced according to a rationality that is alien to the labourer and which 
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benefits the capitalist: exchange value. It is not that the products of reason are 
appropriated, but that the labourer is compelled to produce unreasonable products.4 
 The abstraction of exchange value is a real abstraction insofar as it is enacted 
through social relations. However, it is nonetheless an abstraction from the totality of 
human relations within nature insofar as the valuation of commodities is according to 
exchange value and not use-value. Therefore, “With the disappearance of the useful 
character of the products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied 
in them also disappears” (Marx, 128). Because of this abstraction, the concrete forms of 
labour are reduced in the eyes of the capitalist to labour in the abstract. Labour becomes 
a function to which the human animal must conform. 
 We have come to a crucial point which must be understood in order to fully 
comprehend the irrational character of alienated labour. In drawing out the difference 
between the concrete forms of labour (the production of use-value) and human labour in 
the abstract, Marx is not simply referring to the abstract valuation of commodities 
according to socially necessary labour time, but is in fact pointing out the a priori 
distance between the objective circumstances which compel the capitalist to appropriate 
and apply surplus in particular ways, and the concrete circumstances of the people 
doing the actual producing. The capitalist operates from the standpoint of distribution, 
and therefore structures their behavior around exchange value and forces the labourer 
to do the same. In other words, because the labourer and capitalist have different needs 
according to their objective relationship with the means of production – including the self-
created objective circumstances of production and the land and resources – and only 
one of them has control over surplus, only one is free to not just meet their needs but to 
invest that surplus to create new objective circumstances for themselves. The capitalist 
must ensure by all means that the labourer is not able to control surplus, lest they 
 
4 Thus the possibility of crises of over-accumulation. The labourer produces not according to need, 
but to exchange value which is realized through a particular demand for a product. When the demand falls 
the production of that product does not automatically slow down, rather it must be corrected by an 
objective crisis of stagnation of the circulation of capital. 
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transcend the very situation which compels them to sell their labour, and the capitalist 
finds themselves out of the means to produce value of any sort. 
 We have a situation in capitalist society where the subject is primarily removed 
from the means of production, meaning that they must seek out an alien means in order 
to be productive and meet their needs. The subject is compelled, in order to meet the 
necessarily requirements of their own objective existence in the form of food, shelter, etc. 
to sell their labour. This is labour not to produce use-value determined by the objective 
circumstances of the labourer to directly fulfill their needs, but is a productive activity 
geared toward the creation of exchange value to the benefit of the capitalist. The 
capitalist benefits because they appropriate the products of labour. Because the 
capitalist controls the surplus they are able to invest it and change their objective 
circumstances. The laboring subject is entirely reliant on this process in order to ensure 
their continued objective existence. They have no agency over this process and so exist 
as mere objects, unable to realize their subjective being in the world as a being which is 
capable of applying reason to their objective circumstances and carrying out the material 
realization of that reason. 
 The objectification of the subject and the socialization of the commodity are real 
abstractions with consequences for consciousness. Marx explicates some 
consequences of the appearance of commodities in section four of the first chapter of 
Capital, “The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret,” in which he asserts that 
commodities are seen as social beings that act upon us, while we are seen as 
commodities through the abstraction of labour power. This is because the demands put 
on production by exchange value obscure the commodity’s use-value and thus the 
concrete forms of labour behind it. Rather than recognize this hidden component to the 
commodity, the actors in the marketplace take the alien determinant of value, exchange 
value, to be that commodity’s essence. In other words, one is only able to perceive the 
commodity in relation to oneself, a relation which is dictated by the alien logic of the 
commodity.  
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2.4. Imposed Abstractions as Barriers to Freedom 
 Marx begins Capital: “The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of 
production prevails appears as an ‘immense collection of commodities’” [my italics] 
(Marx, Capital Volume I 125). What we see here could be read as a statement on the 
phenomenology of the commodity in contrast to the concrete totality of wealth, as 
statement on the apparent separation of the abstract appearance and the concrete 
reality of wealth. 5  But this “appearance,” while having consequences for the 
consciousness of the subject in the form of commodity fetishism, in which immanent 
appearance is confused for being in its totality, is nonetheless a real appearance. That is, 
not only does the commodity form obscure use-value and the concrete labour behind it, 
but the real appearance of commodities reveals a real limit to wealth production in 
capitalism due to the constraints of the commodity form.  
 Burkett points out that the starting point of Marx’s analysis of society is the 
production of “wealth,” specifically defined as use-values (25). Burkett claims that the 
root of this definition of wealth is in Marx’s materialist ontology, with which we are 
already familiar: wealth is the result of the trans-historical capacity of human beings to 
create surplus through labour (Burkett 43). Human beings fulfill their needs and in doing 
so create new needs – all through the production of wealth, or use-values. The term 
“wealth” in the first sentence of Capital designates the entire array of the results of the 
appropriation of nature to the satisfaction of human needs. 
 John Holloway, in the unpublished essay mentioned in footnote 4, presents an 
even more profound interpretation of Marx’s use of the term “wealth” than does Burkett. 
First, Holloway points out that the word Reichtum is actually better translated as 
“richness” (2). Despite making it clear that his purpose is not to discover the “true” Marx, 
Holloway does refer to Marx’s definition of Reichtum in the Grundrisse: 
 
5 The recognition of “wealth” as the starting point of Capital, not the commodity, I owe entirely to 
John Holloway. He presents his argument in a paper titled “Read Capital: The First Sentence, Or, Capital 
starts with Wealth, not the Commodity,” which is unpublished.  
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In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away [the 
commodity], what is wealth [Reichtum] other than the universality of 
human needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created 
through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery 
over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of 
humanity’s own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative 
potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic 
development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the 
development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as 
measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not produce 
himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain 
something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? 
In bourgeois economics – and in the epoch of production to which it 
corresponds – this complete working-out of the human content appears 
as a complete emptying-out, this universal objectification as total 
alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice 
of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end (qtd. in Holloway 3). 
 
 According to Holloway, wealth is the potential richness of society (4) – the 
unfulfilled potential of human species-being. In other words, the potential of wealth 
transcends the limited social relations through which it is produced, and the 
appropriation of one being’s productions for the sake of another being cuts off the 
process whereby the producer creates for herself her material conditions. Marx is 
pointing out an antagonism between wealth and the commodity, and the point that 
wealth is constrained by the commodity form suggests that within capitalism there is a 
limit to the development and expression of wealth, that wealth in its very nature 
demands emancipation in order to realize its transcendent capacity (Holloway, 4). For 
Holloway, wealth stands as the “unsatisfied subject,” the result of a promise which has 
not yet been satisfied (5). 
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 In capitalist society wealth, “…appears as an ‘immense collection of 
commodities’.” This appearance is also a real limit put on wealth, imposed on the basis 
of an abstraction from the transcendent possibilities of that wealth. In other words, in 
capitalist society the labourer as subject and commodity as object are abstracted, they 
are compelled by an alien logic. Furthermore, if we are to understand abstraction as a 
determination of a particular aspect and the negation of its totality, then concrete labour 
and its potential is made “less than.” That is, the labourer becomes just that: a labourer. 
In the gaze of the alien rationale of the capitalist, which has as its vantage point the site 
of distribution, the site of profit, the subject is identified simply with the act of labour. 
Nothing of the subject is permitted to expend beyond this abstract determination, and the 
subject is therefore reduced to the being of an object. The commodity, labour, is reduced 
to an expression of exchange value, as opposed to its use within a totality of objective 
circumstances and subjective needs. 
 In capitalist society we have, on the level of abstractions which are made 
concrete, real barriers to first the realization of the possibilities of our objective 
circumstances. These barriers are the negation the subject’s self-determination in order 
to control the labour process, as well as the abstraction of the commodity form from the 
totality of objective circumstances and the needs of human beings within those 
circumstances. We are faced, then, with a totalizing abstraction insofar as its rationale 
extends to both subjects and objects, an abstraction which, despite its totalizing drive, 
makes determinations that are inevitably less that the real, transcendent essence of 
subject and object. Simply, the world and we within it exist as far more than the 
expectations of capital, and the space of this distance is the site of contradictions which 
are at the heart of the degradation of nature. 
 The categories of this abstraction, enforced according to exchange value, extend 
a priori to material existence, beyond the immediate realm of production. 6 That is, 
everything becomes quantifiable in relation to production and exchange. 
 
6 The extension of the categories of “abstract” and “concrete” beyond labour and the commodity 
to the totality of natural existence is the direct result of a discussion with my good friends Ben Levy, an 
 
 18 
2.5. One-Sidedness in Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood 
 Marx’s discussion of the “one-sidedness” of private property legislation in 
Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood is useful to understand exactly how the free 
application of reason is hindered by abstract private property relations - and is 
especially useful in clearing up and confusion about the discrepancy between the 
abstract form of the state, law, custom, norms, practice, etc. and the material content or 
dimension of that society. 
 What is being discussed is the legislative categorization of the customary 
collection of dead wood from the private forests of landowners by the poor as “theft.” 
Marx points out that as this law is in contradiction with material reality it is in fact a 
dishonest law, “...the legislator would have to draw up the following conclusion: It is 
because a box on the ear is not regarded as murder that is has become so frequent. It 
should be decreed therefore that a box on the ear is murder” (First Supplement par. 6). 
The analogy fits, however, unlike a strike to the ear, Marx does not consider the 
collection of dead wood to be an offence.  
 In order to understand this we must realize the nature of private property 
legislation in general as an abstraction from material reality to private ends. In recounting 
the legislative transition from feudal custom to modern right, Marx outlines the 
transition’s inherent “one-sidedness.” Because feudal property took the form of a hybrid 
between private and common, insofar as the use of property was dictated by custom, 
private property law because of its very nature must be “one-sided.” This is simply 
because private property legislation takes as its starting point one aspect of property, 
while the social relations (customs) that operate with that property as its nucleus are in 
fact more complex that simple relations of ownership or rent (Second Supplement par. 4). 
Therefore, all those who’s “right” is not sustained by the new legislation are excluded - 
and as modern legislation around property is focused on private property the state of 
existence for those forgotten is one of privation. Marx uses the example of the 
monastery: the poor had no “right” per se to receive support from the monastery, but it 
 
M.A. graduate of Sociology and Anthropology at Simon Fraser University, and John Bogardus, Senior 
Lecturer of Sociology and Anthropology at SFU. 
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was custom for the monastery to provide such support. When the land of the monastery 
was converted into private land, while the church may have received financial 
compensation (as in the sale of private property), the poor are only worse off (Second 
Supplement par. 4). 
 Private property is therefore one-sided - it serves the needs of some and de-
prives others even in the moment of becoming private. Therefore, Marx demands for the 
poor a “customary right” (First Supplement par. 34). This is a seemingly contradictory 
term, for elsewhere in the discussion Marx points out that the role of right is in fact to 
ensure that custom does not contradict what is just (hence the French Revolution fought 
for Right against the Customs of the aristocracy). What Marx is calling for is to put into 
right what has until that time only been an informal custom for the poor - that which has 
been forgotten in the one-sided abstraction of private property laws from the more 
complex social relations that take property as its locus. Customary right, then, would 
transcend the one-sidedness of private property insofar as it would prevent the narrow 
interest of the property holder from infringing on the customary practices of the poor 
which the poor in fact require to maintain their existence. 
 At the centre of this argument is the notion of “one-sidedness.”. We see in the 
operation of “one-sidedness,” in the transformation of hybrid properties into private 
properties, the essential abstraction of capital. The one-sided abstraction of private 
property, abstract because it is rationalized apart from a larger whole and one-sided 
because it suits the interests of some and not others, puts unreasonable demands on 
the material reality of that “property.” On the side of abstraction, we see the right of the 
land-owner, who has paid for the land and now is free to do with it as he pleases - but 
before this abstraction there was the concrete reality of the social relations organized 
around that property, which the landowner now arbitrarily seeks to criminalize as “theft” 
of wood. 
 The absurdity of the one-sided abstraction of private property is highlighted even 
further when we remember that custom of collecting dead wood is a rational means of 
meeting the demands of one’s needs within particular circumstances. The collection of 
dead wood is the poor family’s only recourse, as they themselves lack a right to access 
 20 
trees. The criminalization of the collection of dead wood represents more than just unjust 
immiseration, but is in fact unjust insofar as it makes a crime of rational activity - rational 
activity which is in fact necessary if the poor are not to freeze. 
 The abstraction of private property as a form, and alienated abstraction in 
general, puts a demand on its material content, including social relations. This content 
exists before the demand as more than the abstraction made of it, but after this demand 
the material reality is expected to conform. In concrete reality the social relations 
surrounding the monastery are much more than an abstract conception of the monastery 
grounds as “private property,” which necessarily excludes all social relations which are 
contrary to the right to withhold access to that property. Thus in the privatization of the 
monastery grounds the poor are excluded, and their freedom to apply reason to meet 
their needs is denied - in effect the very process by which the poor enact their human-
ness in this sense is denied when private property is universalized. In the case of the 
wood collector it is even criminalized.7 
 
 Human beings are beings within and as nature. We are beings as nature 
because we cannot escape our objective existence without denying our being as 
humans; we have an objective form which must be maintained. We are beings within 
nature because our fundamental, subjective capacity to produce in order to ensure our 
existence is conditioned by natural possibilities and limits. Our needs are determined by 
our material conditions, yet it is our ability to apply reason in a material capacity, in order 
to potentially transcend these needs, which sets us apart from animals. Through shaping 
the material world in order to satisfy needs, human beings change their material 
circumstances, and thus create for themselves new needs. History, then, is to be 
 
7	  For example, in Vancouver it is illegal to pitch a makeshift shelter. The homeless are not only 
refused property, but are refused property on the grounds that to do otherwise creates an eyesore in the park. 
Worst of all it permits them some sort of stability whereby they might make other selfish demands! Indeed 
when human beings are able to satisfy one need the another need may be addressed, and the greatest threat 
to a municipal government controlled by the real-estate market is a population of poor which have gained 
the stable platform in the shape of a roof over their heads with which to develop a politics of resistance. 
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understood as the sequence of productive social relations and material conditions, or 
technology, as needs are transcended and new needs arise, creating contradictions 
between the objective circumstances of society and subjective needs and desires. It 
must be stressed here that this is not a mechanistic process - at the centre of this 
process is the human subject who fundamentally has the capacity to apply reason. 
 Labour, the ability to appropriate nature and fashion it according to the demands 
of necessity, is at the centre of history and human becoming. Thus, to appropriate the 
products of labour is to appropriate the means by which need is satisfied and to alienate 
the activity of labour from its foundation in necessity and human self-creation. In other 
words, appropriated labour is alienated from a rationality of self-determination. Instead, 
labour is compelled by the rationality not of use-value, which is determined by the 
material circumstances of human beings, but by exchange value. This one-sided 
determination is an abstraction that obscures use-value and the concrete labour which 
produces it. In doing so, the labourer too is abstracted and is reduced in society to an 
objective source of labour power. 
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Chapter 3. Repressive needs and Inner Freedom in One-Dimensional Man 
 For Marcuse, repressive needs prevent the development of “inner freedom” 
(Marcuse, 10). To argue this statement I will first explain what repressive needs are in 
the context of Marcuse’s understanding of needs in general. Next, I will explain what 
Marcuse means by socially necessary labour. Finally, I will explain that creation of 
repressive needs is socially necessary labour because repressive needs prevent the 
development of what Marcuse calls “inner freedom.” 
 For Marcuse, there is a tension between the needs of individuals and the needs 
of society. Marcuse writes, “The creation of repressive needs has long since become 
part of socially necessary labor - necessary in the sense that without it, the established 
mode of production could not be sustained” (One-Dimensional Man, 246). Individuals of 
course do not live in a historical vacuum, and the chances of the satisfaction of individual 
needs have always been determined by the “prevailing societal institutions and interests” 
(Marcuse, 4). In other words, there have always been dominant powers in society that 
have put general demands on individuals and groups in order to satisfy particular 
interests, and individuals tend to act as if those interests were their own. The individual 
is forced to deny particular needs for the sake of the continuation of these institutions 
and interests (Marcuse, 2, 3). Labour, for example, demands the renunciation of 
immediate gratification. Furthermore, individuals tend to act as if those interests were 
their own. In order to exist in a given society not only does the individual have to deny 
some needs, but they must internalize social needs. By “social needs” I intend 
specifically those requirements imposed by the dominant institutions and interests upon 
activity, and which uphold the status quo. The individual learns what is expected of them 
by the institutions and interests of their society, and they identify with these interests 
insofar as their satisfaction suits some needs of the individual. Insofar as submission 
grants access to subsistence, the sacrifice of some needs for the gratification of others 
seems reasonable. In advanced industrial society, specifically, the individual identifies 
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with the expectations superimposed upon them insofar as their submission is rewarded 
by an ever increasing quality of life. 
 According to Marcuse, freedom from want is the “concrete substance of all 
freedom” (1). However, the prevailing societal institutions and interests are oriented 
otherwise; Marcuse sees their interest as lying in the maintenance of domination. He 
writes, “the requirements of mass production are not necessarily that of human beings” 
(Marcuse, 244). The requirements of mass production are determined by the dominant 
institutions and interests, and insofar as mass production is not oriented toward the 
freedom from want there is an antagonism between individual needs and social needs. 
Repressive needs are those which are superimposed by the productive apparatus under 
conditions of unfreedom. Conditioned by this state of unfreedom, the individual is forced 
to pursue ends that are not their own, despite the possibility of liberation. 
 Marcuse sees the creation of repressive needs as labour that is socially 
necessary. “Socially necessary labour” simply means the ways in which life must be 
arranged and prefigured, the ways in which human energy must be compelled or 
coerced, in order to satisfy whatever the social needs are. Ultimately, socially necessary 
labour is necessary because without it the technological apparatus, the foundation of the 
dominant institutions and interests, could not be maintained. 
 However, Marcuse is not just interested in labour in the colloquial sense of 
employment. Usually when we think of labour we think of work in terms of earning a 
wage or the type of labour involved in maintaining a family or household, or even labour 
in terms of time spent outside work recuperating and reviving one’s body and mind for 
the return to work. In short, we think of labour as those functions which support one’s 
material existence. For instance, in a capitalist economy, labour is socially necessary 
because production would not happen without it - at least not in a way conducive to the 
appropriation and concentration of wealth. Because the dominant interests are oriented 
toward a certain end (the mass production of wealth on an ever greater scale), labour, 
insofar as it is a function crucial to the realization of this end, is socially necessary. 
 In One-Dimensional Man Marcuse is more concerned with consciousness than 
economy, and he understands the creation of repressive needs to be a form of socially 
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necessary labour. Therefore, we must understand his statement as not just regarding 
one type or function of labour among others, but in terms of its product, repressive 
needs, and that product’s effect on consciousness. While the creation of the material 
component of these needs, the massive quantities of goods and services including the 
culture industries, is achieved by labour, we can only understand why the creation of 
repressive needs is socially necessary if we understand what it achieves. 
 In order to understand why the creation of repressive needs is socially necessary 
we must know how it is that repressive needs uphold contemporary society. There are 
obvious examples of that which is socially necessary for the prevailing institutions and 
interests. Take, for example, the massive financial institutions which utilize debt on a 
global scale as the basis of a functioning economy, debt which itself makes necessary 
the availability of employment and the structuring of daily life around the function of 
labour. Marcuse finds these types of economic examples to be troubling insofar as the 
reproduction and satisfaction of such needs is the basis of economic domination. 
However, regardless of economic concerns, when Marcuse talks about needs he is 
talking about all the ways in which we live our lives. He is concerned not just with labour, 
but leisure, not just with obvious economic exploitation, but enjoyment. Needs are the 
way in which people project beyond their immediate circumstances to what they wish to 
achieve. It is according to needs that people structure their activity. 
 Marcuse states that without the creation of repressive needs, “the established 
mode of production could not be sustained” (246). If the mode of production in the 
economic or technological sense includes such socially necessary forms of activity such 
as labour, administration, the organization of space to suit the needs of a steady flow of 
business, and other forms of activity and organization which uphold the mode of 
production, then we must consider that he is saying that repressive needs also uphold 
the mode of production. Repressive needs make necessary a personal investment in the 
mode of production in the sense that the ways in which individuals who have internalized 
repressive needs wish to live their lives necessitates submission to social needs. 
 Marcuse writes, “We may distinguish both true and false needs. “False” are those 
which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his 
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repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice” (5). 
Marcuse explains that these false needs, despite being superimposed, are internalized 
by the individual. That is, they are needs, and the individual experiences them as such, 
as something personal in which they are invested and upon the satisfaction of which 
they depend. Conversely, there is nothing inherent in the necessary function of labour 
that promotes identification with the system. The developing working class of the 19th 
century had an antagonistic relationship with the mode of production. Labour was 
undesirable, even detrimental to the labourer’s life. They recognized that the apparatus 
undermined to their true needs and were occasionally driven to revolt.  
 Marcuse is concerned with the fact that today the majority of individuals actually 
identify with the system even though it keeps them in a state of unfreedom. “But in the 
contemporary period, the technological controls appear to be the very embodiment of 
Reason for the benefit of all social groups and interests - to such an extent that all 
contradiction seems irrational and all counteraction impossible” (Marcuse, 9). That is, 
despite the prevailing irrationality and unfreedom of society, individuals are fully invested 
in the needs of society as if they were their own. Indeed, it is precisely because social 
needs have become the individual’s own that contradiction and counteraction seems 
irrational and impossible - because to act against the system would be to act against the 
means of satisfying those very needs! 
 Marcuse calls these superimposed needs “false needs” (5). Despite their rational 
appearance, and no matter how invested, how free the individual may think they are, 
these needs retain their falsity. They are false because they are superimposed on the 
individual by the requirements of the apparatus, and, insofar as they are internalized by 
the individual and believed to be their own, they arrest the potential to perceive the 
overwhelming irrational character of society. This society is irrational because, by 
superimposing false needs, it keeps the possibility of freedom, in terms of the 
development of a society committed to permanent freedom from want, from being 
realized. 
 For the individual to internalize needs which are in fact contrary to the individual’s 
freedom, they must believe this sacrifice to be rational. In contemporary industrial 
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society, capable of producing massive quantities of wealth, it is the conquest of scarcity 
which “spreads a repressive productivity and “false needs”” (Marcuse, 241). That is, it is 
the sheer quantity of goods and services available in this society that encourages 
identification with social needs. These goods and services may not be immediately 
available for appropriation by whomever, whenever necessary, but it is enough that the 
individual knows the only way to access this wealth is by submission to the apparatus. 
They submit because what the system has to offer is simply too much to resist, and, 
regardless, the individual knows no alternative. No other society has ever produced so 
much wealth, and this particular achievement obscures the irrationality of the whole. The 
individual rationalizes the negative features of the mode of production as simple, 
inevitable by-products of the creation of a better and better lifestyle (Marcuse, 225). 
Unfreedom is itself rationalized as having no use value, as only conformity grants access 
to this wealth. 
 However, it is not the case that the individual exists as an independent power 
that freely chooses to participate in production and consumption. Rather, the individual is 
completely invested, physically and mentally, in production and consumption - they rely 
upon it entirely. As a result, their consciousness is unable to achieve the critical distance 
required to observe society’s irrational limits. On this Marcuse writes, “the subject which 
is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence” (11). Alienation is the state in 
which the objects that constitute one’s world are experienced as having a power over 
and above the individuals in that world. This implies consciousness of the tension 
between oneself and the world. But the subject in contemporary society is swallowed up 
by its alienated existence; alienation comes to be the de facto mode of existence. 
Submission to the overwhelming rational organization of the system of production and 
distribution is accepted as rational and advantageous. Therefore, the vast quantitative 
aspect of social wealth also has a qualitative aspect. Production, distribution, and 
consumption overwhelm all aspects of life from labour to leisure. Even the most private, 
intimate moments are enveloped by a world of commodities and services. Not only are 
we alienated from society and its mode of production, we are overwhelmed by its wealth 
and the rationality of unfreedom, and we enjoy our subservience. The totalitarian aspect 
of the society reveals itself in the fact that its products, services, demands and 
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proscribed desires are always with us. It provides no exit, and one cannot even imagine 
that there are walls. 
 The totally overwhelming presence of the society and mode of production in our 
daily lives illuminates a contradiction between contemporary society and freedom. 
Marcuse asks us, “Can a society which is incapable of protecting individual privacy even 
within one’s four walls rightfully claim that it respects the individual and that it is a free 
society?” (245). We may believe ourselves to be free when we live within the seemingly 
rational dictates of industrial society, totally immersed and invested in the predetermined 
paths laid out for us, but as soon as we attempt a retreat from society we notice that the 
society structures every moment of our lives. It is the backdrop which conditions all 
activities. We are entirely dependent on the apparatus and any retreat is always 
conditioned by the overwhelming presence of society and its demand to produce and 
consume - there can be no peace of body and mind except for the very rich. It is 
precisely because the society does not respect the individual, that daily life is 
conditioned by the pursuit of false needs which keep the individual from realizing their 
potential, that we are not free. Freedom would mean freedom from the society (Marcuse, 
4), but this negative freedom is absolutely unbearable for the institutions that demand 
productivity in exchange for existence. So long as we are unnecessarily forced to 
perpetually chase satisfaction of our vital needs through involvement and investment in 
the apparatus, despite the growing possibility of permanently pacifying the struggle for 
existence, we cannot be free as individuals. 
 It is precisely the elimination of the possibility of the private, autonomous 
individual, through the creation and internalization of false needs, which is socially 
necessary. This is because without the internalization of false needs individuals might 
recognize the irrational character of contemporary society and be driven to reject it. The 
private, autonomous individual is crucial to liberation because “the attainment of 
autonomy demands conditions in which the repressed dimensions of experience can 
come to life again; their liberation demands the repression of the heteronomous needs 
and satisfactions which organize life in this society” (Marcuse, 245). The heteronomous 
needs and satisfactions which organize life in this society are of course those needs, 
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desires, and liberties which are superimposed upon the individual and which she 
identifies with. They are the false needs around which we construct our lives. 
 The heteronomous false needs, satisfactions and demands that are 
superimposed on the individual are contrary to the development of what Marcuse calls 
“inner freedom,” that “private space in which man may become and remain “himself”” 
(10). The heteronomous ways in which we organize our lives and the internalization of 
social needs are contrary and antagonistic to that private, inner freedom in which the 
autonomous, critical individual develops. If the individual is wrapped up in public 
existence, completely overwhelmed by false needs which are the same as everybody 
else’s and which work to perpetuate an irrational society that keeps the individual in a 
state of complete mobilization despite the possibility of liberation, in a state of complete 
satisfaction despite her unfreedom, she will not develop needs that are autonomous 
from, let alone antagonistic to, totalitarian society. Autonomy from the society demands 
repression of false needs - the individual must be confronted with themselves, with the 
pervasive unhappiness, with the “fear, frustration and disgust” lying just below the “thin 
surface” of satisfaction (Marcuse, 76). Caught up in a cycle of petty gratifications and 
unconscious investment, that fear, frustration, and disgust that Marcuse believes to be 
so pervasive will never be acknowledged. That which is unacknowledged and made 
invisible simply cannot develop into a revolutionary force. Individuals must confront that 
inner dimension in order to recognize, through reflection, the true conditions of their 
existence. It is by superimposing false needs and satisfactions which perpetuate the 
denial of this inner dimension that the society “denies freedom at its hidden roots” 
(Marcuse, 245). 
 The creation of false needs is socially necessary because they keep individuals 
from recognizing their true needs. The realization of the individual’s true needs would 
make them notice the irrationality of society, which is antagonistic to those needs. 
“Deprived of his false fathers, leaders, friends, and representatives, he [the individual in 
contemporary society] would have to learn his ABC’s again. But the words and 
sentences which he would form might come out very differently, and so might his 
aspirations and fears” (Marcuse, 246). That is, deprived of the ways in which we invest 
ourselves in society, the false needs which we believe to be freely chosen under 
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conditions of unfreedom, the infantile desires and pastimes and the industries of 
distraction, the individual would enter into a different relationship with themselves. This 
relationship would not be one of total involvement in and identification with the society, 
but one of reflection upon oneself and the society - it would be characterized by the 
development of a critical distance. The individual would be thrown back upon 
themselves, left to the thoughts and desires that were repressed in the pursuit of false 
needs. They would be forced to rethink the meaning of their lives and the ways in which 
they organize their activity. 
 It is only through the destruction of the possibility of introspection by the creation 
of repressive needs that individuals can identify so strongly with the mode of production. 
The development of this inner space is necessarily intimate and individual. 
Heteronomous needs squeeze out any semblance of individual needs and desires 
separate from the conforming masses.  The needs that would develop if the individual 
experienced some privacy from society might be antagonistic to those heteronomous 
false needs and the system that they support. The individual who reflects upon 
themselves might recognize misery under the thin veil of happiness and be less willing to 
tolerate the system, less quick to rationalize unfreedom. The creation of repressive 
needs is socially necessary because they keep this consciousness from developing, 
therefore keeping people happy, productive, and totally unfree. 
 Advanced industrial society has achieved great wealth and beat back the 
conditions in which nature stands as an obstacle to our existence. However, in the 
process we have established a society that demands total mobilization and investment in 
the productive apparatus despite having the wealth available to pacify vital needs. 
Individuals are kept in a web of hour by hour desire. Constantly seeking distractions 
among a cornucopia of wealth, the individual is unable to look beyond their own 
immediate horizon to the irrational limits of the society, nor are they able to develop an 
inner dialogue autonomous from their false needs and distractions. Marcuse writes, “All 
liberation depends on the consciousness of servitude, and the emergence of this 
consciousness is always hampered by the predominance of needs and satisfactions 
which, to a great extent, have become the individual’s own” (7). When individuals believe 
themselves to have freely chosen that which has been laid out for them, when they rest 
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content in childish pleasures and animal satisfactions, when they participate uncritically, 
identify with their cage, and savour the scraps provided, not only do they unconsciously 
reproduce the system that dominates them, but they are kept from developing an inner 
dialogue in which they might realize that their fears, needs, and desires are quite 
different than what they thought them to be. Consciousness of servitude is the antithesis 
of identification with it, and contemporary society relies on the prevalence of false needs 
and their temporary gratification to keep people in servitude to and personal involvement 
with the mode of production. 
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Chapter 4. Transcendence and Rebellious Subjectivity in The Aesthetic 
Dimension 
 In The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse argues that experiencing art interrupts 
unreflective involvement in the world of appearances, infecting experience with 
awareness of an inner dimension that is suppressed and distorted by those appearances. 
To demonstrate this point I will first explain what Marcuse means by “immediate reality” 
and how it is constituted by “the reified objectivity of established social relations” (7). 
Next, I will explain how art, through an “aesthetic sublimation,” achieves transcendence 
of immediate reality before showing how the transcendence of immediate reality results 
in an “aesthetic desublimation,” or the realization of the repressive nature of reality. 
Finally, I will show that aesthetic desublimation opens a “new” dimension of experience 
which Marcuse calls “rebirth of the rebellious subjectivity” (7). 
 In the statement which is the object of investigation in this essay Marcuse splits 
reality into different aspects or gradations of experience. Marcuse writes, “The 
transcendence of immediate reality shatters the reified objectivity of established social 
relations and opens a new dimension of experience: rebirth of the rebellious 
subjectivity”[my italics] (7). Marcuse’s use of the word “immediate” to condition the word 
“reality” tells us that for Marcuse there are different aspects of reality, or different 
dimensions of experience, that may or may not be consciously acknowledged. 
 The first dimension of experience that Marcuse is clearly pointing to in the 
sentence above is “immediate reality.” The other is the “new dimension” opened up by 
the transcendence of immediate reality. For Marcuse, it is the work of art which 
transcends immediate reality, opening up the new dimension. While the object of the 
sentence is “transcendence,” and it is the act of transcendence which leads to 
consciousness of the new dimension, the nature of “transcendence” is that it transcends 
something. Therefore, we must understand what is being transcended, in this case 
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“immediate reality,” if we are to understand what Marcuse means by transcendence and 
how it opens up a new dimension of experience. 
 What Marcuse means by “immediate reality” is the world of appearances. 
Immediate reality is that aspect of experience that is immediately available to 
consciousness. It is the unreflected upon world of sensuousness and daily activity by 
which we are always surrounded and in which we are usually involved.  
The immediate really is “immediate,” and therefore unreflective involvement in 
immediate reality excludes that which is not immediate, that which has been or could be. 
Immediate reality has the temporal quality of being “now” to the exclusion of “was” or 
“will.” Immediate reality is always in a state of appearing as it appears to be, and 
consciousness cannot, when equipped with nothing but appearance, go beyond the 
apparent immediate reality to comprehend the nature of their involvement in it. The 
consciousness of appearance as something distinct, as opposed to history or possibility, 
demands consciousness of something other than what is apparent, and it is exactly this 
“other” which is denied by the immediacy of immediate reality. 
Usually in daily life we are totally involved in immediate reality. We act at work as 
though we are the barista in the cafe, at the store as if we are the consumer. Especially 
in contemporary society, our lives are constituted by one series of performances after 
another, adapted according to social expectations and the immediate requirements of 
the situation in a world of objects beyond our control. We are enveloped by the 
organization of our surroundings and, for the most part, this experience, in its 
overwhelming immediacy, appears wholly rational. Reality just appears to us and we 
respond to it from a stock of internalized norms and values. We simply respond to and 
engage in immediate reality in the ways that seem most appropriate. 
While immediate reality has the appearance of being “now” to the exclusion of 
other temporal dimensions, the world itself is historical. It is the historical world in which 
we are born and die, in which the constant struggle between nature and society is 
carried out, and which is the hidden backdrop behind immediate experience. As the 
world itself is historical, then this historical dimension lies behind and is constitutive of 
immediate reality, although it is not immediately available in the appearance of 
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immediate reality. Immediate reality cannot exist independently of everything else that is, 
was, or could be, despite its appearance. That is, immediate reality is not only 
appearance, but appearance is all that is immediately available to unreflective 
experience. 
Marcuse points to the historical nature of the world when he states that “it is the 
reified objectivity of established social relations” [my italics] which is shattered by the 
“transcendence of immediate reality” (7). In anticipation of the explanation of 
“transcendence” later in this essay, we can see that Marcuse has already given us a 
clue to its meaning when he uses the word “reified” to designate what is shattered by the 
transcendence embodied by the work of art. Furthermore, “reified objectivity” designates 
a particular character of social relations, a particular way that they appear to 
consciousness. 
Reified means objectified or thing-ified. For the purpose of this essay we can 
think of that which is reified as have a quality of apparent stasis, permanence, and 
unchangeability. Quoting Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse writes, “All reification is a 
forgetting” (73). That is, the reified appearance of the world is contrary to the real 
historical nature of the world because reification presents the world as static, permanent, 
and unchangeable in contrast to the world’s historical nature, which involves fluctuation, 
temporality, and changeability. 
Marcuse is saying that “established social relations” are reified and therefore 
have the appearance of immutability. Reified social relations appear not even as things 
once established that are now permanent, but as the way social relations are in their 
very nature. They appear to follow immutable laws. Take for example the neoliberal 
catechism that all human beings are fundamentally motivated by greed, remembering 
that reification excludes consciousness of the historical nature of social relations as well 
as the historical role that those relations play. In the case of the neoliberal catechism 
what is excluded is the historical awareness that we live in a society that exploits the 
majority of the population, subjecting them to a constant state of need, in order to amass 
capital which is again turned around to reproduce capitalist society on an enlarged, more 
destructive, and more exploitative scale, therefore reproducing the conditions which 
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motivate “greed.” There is no inherent greed to human nature, only a society which 
establishes conditions that encourage acts of desperation and exploitation. 
Furthermore, Marcuse is suggesting that immediate reality is intimately tied up 
with reified social relations, as it is the transcendence of immediate reality which 
“shatters the reified objectivity of established social relations” (7). Marcuse writes, for 
example, “The truth of art lies in its power to break the monopoly of established reality 
(i.e., of those who established it) to define what is real” (9), and he also refers to the 
“functional existence and performance in society” (9) of individuals, pointing on the first 
hand to the illusory definition of what is real in established reality, and on the other hand 
to the functional existence and performance, the reification, of individuals and social 
relations in established reality. For Marcuse, the immediate reality, the experience of the 
apparent “now,” is constituted by “the reified objectivity of established social relations,” 
giving immediate reality the appearance of permanence, rationality, and immutability. 
That is, the historical background to immediate reality is hidden from experience by the 
apparent stasis and functionality of the world. Reification presents the world around us 
as constituted by certain objects and relations with particular dynamics and laws in 
which we engage and react. To consciousness these things just “are,” and the historical 
backdrop from which they arise is obscured by their apparent permanence.  
When we are completely involved in the reified objectivity of established social 
relations which is constitutive of immediate reality it cannot be said that we are 
autonomous. Marcuse writes, “Forgetting past suffering and past joy alleviates life under 
a repressive reality principle” (73). Autonomy requires that we are aware of the 
conditions in which we act, but in immediate reality our behaviour is structured by reified 
social relations which obscure the historical nature of the world and our experience, 
therefore rectifying to consciousness a repressive world. We act and react within the 
imposed rules and structures because, for the most part, we do not reflect on immediate 
reality and have forgotten what has passed. To the unreflective individual the reified 
reality is the world in which they live, it is the whole world, and they are unaware that 
their experience and thoughts are structured by illusions, that there might be some truth 
beyond their experience of the world. Autonomy under such conditions is not possible. 
Even leisure is conditioned by reified social relations in the form of the eventual return to 
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work and appropriate, shared, and available forms of leisure. Within the experience of 
immediate reality we live purely reactionary lives, responding to what is imposed and 
required according to the apparently unchanging principles which structure society. 
However, this ahistorical, static quality of immediate reality and experience is what is 
shattered by the transcendence of immediate reality, encouraging a critical awareness of 
one’s self and the world. 
Immediate reality is that realm of experience in which we are unreflectively 
involved. But Marcuse believes that art has the power to transcend immediate reality, 
shatter “reified objectivity,” and open a space for critical reflection on the world and 
ourselves. Because reified objectivity has a politically conservative quality of preserving 
in consciousness the status quo, art, by shattering reified objectivity, can be said to have 
a political quality as well. For Marcuse it is the aesthetic form, art itself, which is political 
(ix). That is, we cannot point to a specific type of art within other types and say that this 
is art of a political nature, while elsewhere we can find art of another nature. For 
Marcuse, all art is political not because of its specific content, or what the art is about, 
but the way in which the content is transformed by the aesthetic form itself. The “content” 
of the work of art is that in immediate reality which is communicated but also 
transformed by the aesthetic form. The transformation of the content shatters the reified 
quality of immediate reality, establishing the work’s legitimacy as “art.” Therefore, only 
those works which achieve the aesthetic form may be called art. 
Not every act of creation, according to Marcuse, can be called art. Art must 
achieve more than just technical mastery or superior representation or expression, it 
must have a particular form. Marcuse defines aesthetic form as “the result of the 
transformation of a given content (actual or historical, personal or social fact) into a self-
contained whole: a poem, play, novel, etc.” (8). Art must of course communicate some 
sort of actual, historical, personal, or social fact. If it did not, then there would be no 
communication at all (Marcuse, 41). However, while art represents the immediate reality 
in order to communicate, art is not bound by the laws of the reified social relations which 
structure that immediate reality. Rather, this content is “taken out” (8) of the socially 
determined world and given an existence and meaning of its own in relation to the self-
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contained whole of the work of art. This is achieved through stylization and the way that 
the work refers to itself for its meaning. Marcuse writes,  
“...in the work this “stuff” [immediate reality], divested of its 
immediacy, becomes something qualitatively different, part of another 
reality. Even where a fragment of reality is left untransformed (for 
example, quoted phrases from a speech by Robespierre) the content is 
changed by the work as a whole; its meaning can even be turned into its 
opposite” (42).  
That is, the component parts of the work get their meaning not from the world or 
immediate reality, but from the way that the world is communicated in the work of art. 
Marcuse calls this communication and transformation of immediate reality “sublimation,” 
(7) and sublimation is what is achieved by the aesthetic form. Through this sublimation 
art is autonomous from reality. 
It is not that the experiences and meanings of the artwork do not exist or are 
somehow less true than the “objective” reality which is transformed and communicated 
by the artwork. Rather, these experiences and meanings “shatter the reified objectivity of 
established social relations” (7) and expose themselves as more than the world of 
appearance (Marcuse, 54). Experiences and objects, people and events are taken out of 
their thing-ified being. The boundaries imposed by reified social relations on that which is 
and that which is not, on possibility itself, are smashed. The artwork’s existence and 
meaning are not determined by the reified objectivity of established social relations, and 
by that very virtue they transcend immediate reality. By “transcend” I mean the artwork 
goes beyond the limits of immediate reality. The fact that there is more to experience 
and the objects of experience than the unreflective experience of immediate reality is 
exposed by the sublimative transcendence of the artistic form. Furthermore, because art 
transcends it necessarily reveals the limits of that which it transcends. 
By virtue of the aesthetic form and its sublimation of the given reality, the artwork 
shows the world as permeated with subjectivity, otherwise hidden and repressed in daily 
life. Marcuse writes, “The encounter with the truth of art happens in the estranging 
language and images which make perceptible, visible, and audible that which is no 
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longer, or not yet, perceived, said, and heard in everyday life” (72). To be sure, reified 
social relations do exist, but their appearance as reified is an illusion and entails the 
suppression of subjectivity, memory, and autonomy in order to maintain the illusion. The 
reified objectivity of immediate reality is maintained for the sake of order and control, but 
art reveals this reality to be permeated with subjectivity and difference, of that which in 
its existence transcends the reified conceptions of what is real and therefore exposes 
the repressive quality of life in this society.  
The reified world is only a part of what is real; it is the world of appearances. The 
world is far more complex than democracy, market relations, or patriarchy. Its objects 
cannot be reduced in their very existence to the static, operational being that reification 
presents as an image. In other words, the real essence of things is antagonistic to the 
reified appearance. Reification suppresses historical awareness, but it substitutes 
historical awareness only for an image - it does not displace history itself. The 
representation in art of the real being behind the appearance transcends the boundaries 
of reification by exposing it as merely an image. “With the affirmation of the inwardness 
of subjectivity, the individual steps out of the network of exchange relationships and 
exchange values, withdraws from the reality of bourgeois society, and enters another 
dimension of existence” (Marcuse, 4). In other words the affirmation of subjectivity is 
antagonistic to mere appearances and allows the subject to step out of identification with 
immediate reality, encouraging a critical awareness of the world and experience. The 
subject, too, is real, and acknowledgement of the complexity of subjective experience 
reveals the ways in which the subject is forced to be other than free in society. 
Because art exposes different aspects of reality that are excluded and 
misrepresented in the immediate reality, art necessarily opposes the immediate reality.  
Marcuse writes, “... the world formed by art is recognized as a reality which is 
suppressed and distorted in the given reality. This experience [of the world formed by art] 
culminates in extreme situations… which explode the given reality in the name of a truth 
normally denied or even unheard” (6). Art violates the boundaries put on experience and 
the objects of experience, and thereby shatters their reified appearance given by 
immediate reality, revealing them as something historical, created, and changeable.  
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Marcuse refers to the opposition to immediate reality as an aesthetic 
desublimation. He writes, “... on the basis of aesthetic sublimation, a desublimation takes 
place in the perception of individuals - in their feelings, judgements, thoughts; an 
invalidation of dominant norms, needs, and values” (Marcuse, 7). That is, the sublimative 
transformation of the world releases experience from the constraints of the world, and 
those aspects of experience which were previously invisible, unexpressed, or 
suppressed are acknowledged and given room for expression. Because of the contrast 
between the world represented in art and reality, reality is revealed in its repressive 
nature. By refusing to reduce its expression to mere copy of immediate reality, and 
instead exposing the limits of immediate reality, art thrusts into the awareness of 
individuals the repressive nature of immediate reality (Marcuse, 51). By recalling, for 
example, the unacknowledged discontents of the individual art removes them from the 
order which rationalizes or represses them as subjective in contrast to the “real” 
objective situation and gives them meaning and force in their own right. 
In restructuring our awareness of the world and ourselves, art challenges the 
monopoly of the established reality to determine what is “real” (Marcuse, 9).  Art creates 
a fictitious world which is nevertheless “more real than reality itself”” (Marcuse, 22). That 
is, art liberates subjectivity from unconscious reactive existence in immediate reality by 
revealing immediate reality as reified, and by acknowledging as real those aspects of 
subjectivity which have been suppressed or rationalized as unreal. This is why Marcuse 
says that the transcendence of art open a “new” dimension. Art represents aspects of 
reality hitherto unacknowledged and makes them communicable and available to 
consciousness in a way that is antagonistic to unreflective involvement in the world. 
Marcuse writes, “the encounter with the fictitious world restructures consciousness and 
gives sensual representation to a counter-societal experience” (44). The transformation 
of reality, the injection of the subjective element, forces upon individuals a reflective view 
on reality and legitimizes this reflective awareness of reality not as something foolish or 
“out of touch” but as real and repressed in immediate reality. 
Marcuse states that the opening of the new dimension of experience is 
synonymous with the “rebirth of the rebellious subjectivity” (7). By virtue of the aesthetic 
form, “Subject and objects encounter the appearance of that autonomy which is denied 
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them in their society” (Marcuse, 72). That is, by revealing the possibility of freedom, art 
instills individuals with the need to create a new social order, one which respects the 
autonomy of people and things. The individual, with their new consciousness of this 
dimension, is faced with a choice: acknowledge the fact that the world as it is has a 
repressive quality, that individuals and things are forced by society to have a repressed 
existence, or engage in self-deception. 
It is not that art creates or instills in the individual an inner dimension. It was 
always there, but dormant, unacknowledged, unconscious of itself and even rationalized 
as irrational “subjectivity.” In other words, it was repressed by the unreflective 
involvement encouraged by the reified objectivity of immediate reality. When we are 
purely involved in the world of appearances we are unaware of the ways which we are 
behaving and thinking. This is not to say that we are unconscious, but that we are not 
self-conscious in a way that allows for reflection on possibilities of different ways of 
thinking and acting. However, art creates a distance between individuals and immediate 
reality by mediating immediate reality, allowing the individual to take a step back from 
being fully involved in immediate reality and instead reflect on the mediated reality in the 
artwork. 
We may now comprehend the gravity of the quote which in the beginning of this 
essay I stated to be the object of investigation. For Marcuse, “The transcendence of 
immediate reality shatters the reified objectivity of established social relations and opens 
a new dimension of experience: rebirth of the rebellious subjectivity” (7). Art 
acknowledges not only the immediate reality, but it acknowledges that which is not 
immediate: the subjective and historical aspects of reality which are repressed by 
unreflective involvement in the world of appearances. By virtue of the distance from 
immediate reality created in the work of art, the experience of art interrupts unreflective 
involvement in the world of appearances, infecting experience with consciousness of an 
inner dimension that is suppressed and distorted by those appearances and calling to 
attention the need for liberation. Art shatters that which is reified by revealing that which 
is obscured by immediate reality, exposing the reified world as an illusion. This is 
because the revealed subjective and historical aspects of reality are inherently 
antagonistic to the illusion of stasis and permanence. Therefore, art preserves in 
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memory the possibility of existing in ways other than those prescribed by the dominant 
social order. Art reveals the possibility of freedom itself. 
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